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In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated California's effort to charge lessees of state-
owned lands a negotiated price that was calculated
according to the level of activity on the leased lands. At
first blush, the result seems odd indeed. Why should the
Constitution forbid one particular type of price term in
a leasehold contract between a state and a private party
that desires to lease state land for business purposes?
Adding the information that the lands involved are
coastal lands and/or tidelands, and that leasing such
lands by the oil industry is an operational necessity for
receiving oil transported from overseas or from the
outer continental shelf insures that the case involves
large sums of money. Still, the legal issue is relatively
narrow: the possible unconstitutionality of one among
many lease pricing mechanisms.
ISSUES
Cory u. Westem Oil and Gas Association poses three
distinct legal issues. First, it asks the Supreme Court to
decide whether leasing state lands at a rate fixed by
reference to the amount of goods crossing the parcel is
an unconstitutional burden on interstate and interna-
tional commerce. Second, the case asks whether the
same per-unit lease term amounts to a tax on imports in
violation of the Import-Export Clause of the Constitu-
tion. Finally, the case asks whether the lease arrange-
ment runs afoul of the seldom invoked constitutional
prohibition that forbids states from laying a duty on
tonnage. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was based
alternatively on the Commerce and Import Clauses.
Thus, if the decision to invalidate the California pricing
scheme is affirmed on either of these grounds, the Su-
preme Court need not address either of the other possi-
ble grounds for affirmance. To reverse, however, the
Court must find the lease pricing practice free from
constitutional infirmity on all three grounds.
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The California State Lands Commission is empow-
ered to issue ground leases for a variety of state-owned
lands, including tidelands and uplands along the state's
Pacific coast. California, like most coastal states, owns
the vast majority of the tidelands immediately adjacent
to its shores. The record in the case fixes the total
amount of tidelands and submerged lands in California
at 3 million acres, of which roughly 93% is owned and
regulated by the state. Most of the remaining tidelands
and submerged lands are owned and/or extensively reg-
ulated by local government units. Tideland ownership
extends landward to the mean high tide mark; thus, any
enterprise seeking to carry cargo ashore must make use
of facilities which extend over, 01' are built directly on
tidelands. Accordingly, the substantial monopoly of the
state in its ownership of tidelands renders use of the
state-owned land essential to virtually all maritime and
pipeline commerce that brings goods to shore from the
ocean or from the outer continental shelf.
Companies engaged in offloading cargo own or rent
the uplands on which they construct and operate their
terminal facilities. By virtue of the state's near monopoly
on tideland and submerged land ownership, almost all
terminal facilities must negotiate a lease with the state
for using state land. This is true even in the case that all
of the physical structures are located on privately-owned
fast lands located above the high tide mark. To reach the
upland, the cargo must cross the tideland. Thus, there is
a longstanding pattern of coastal states entering into
profitable leases with companies that operate terminal
facilities.
In this particular case, the California State Lands
Commission (CSLC) in 1976, acting under express legis-
lative authorization, considered adopting an administra-
tive rule that would allow the CSLC to fix the charge for
ground leases of state-owned lands on a basis that re-
flected the volume of activity on the leased parcel. The
extensive administrative hearings held prior to adopting
the rule established that per-unit lease charges were
used in many commercial ground leases, even when the
property was leased in an unimproved state. The rule
finally adopted by the CSLC authorized per-unit lease
charges negotiated with the lessee on a lease-by-lease
basis. A number of oil companies operating marine ter-
minal facilities in California appeared before the CSLC
to oppose the rule.
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After the rule was adopted, several oil companies
and their industry association, the Western Oil and Gas
Association, filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the rule violated the federal constitution.
The suit also raised issues of state administrative law that
were ultimately determined in favor of the CSLC. (See,
105 Cal. App.3d 554, 164 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1980).) The
federal district court, in an unreported decision, found
that the California per-unit pricing scheme for leases
violated the Constitution by imposing the precise type of
"trade barrier" that the Commerce Clause, the Import-
Export Clause and the Tonnage Clause were collectively
intended to prevent. California was enjoined from as-
sessing or collecting leasehold rents on that basis. As
noted above, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed that decision. (See, 726 F.2d 1340 (1983»
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
This appears to be a very significant case, although
the reasons for that conclusion require elaboration. Im-
plicit in a victory for California is the threat that all
coastal states will jump on the bandwagon and collect
sizable rents from tideland rentals. This will be an ex-
pensive turn of events for American consumers. By
winning the case, California would win the ability to fix
lease charges on a per-unit basis, for example, at $1 per
barrel of oil that crosses the leased property. No doubt
many barrels of oil enter the United States in Califor-
nia-each of which could cost $1 more as a result of a
California victory.
There are, however, reasons to think that even a
California victory in the case is of trivial consequence. In
essence, the state already has the power to extort pay-
ment for granting the lease that bears no relation to the
value of the leased land. All that is at stake is the consti-
tutionality of one additional pricing scheme by which
the state can exact its money. The real power of the state
does not lie in the pricing mechanism; the real power is
the state's monopoly ownership of lands necessary for
some facets of all terminal operations-the land between
the shore and open water.
The critical determinant of the significance of the
case lies in the question: "Is there something about per-
unit charges that dramatically increases the leverage of
the coastal states beyond that which they already have in
setting lease prices?" At first glance, the answer seems to
be no, that little leverage is gained by the state. The four
examples of CSLC "throughput charges" (per-unit lease
pricing) cited as epitomizing the constitutional evil are
instances of the state using its bargaining power more
than instances in which per-unit lease pricing provides a
unique advantage to the state. In all of the examples, the
CSLC was in the process of renegotiating a lease with
refinery operators already having huge capital invest-
ment in their oceanside plants. The largest of these
plants, for example, was built at a cost of $723,000,000.
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Obviously, the refiner will agree to pay almost any new,
higher rent California chooses to charge rather than lose
the ability to supply the refinery with raw products for
processing.
Lookir g again at the four examples, the real objec-
tion of the oil and gas industry seems to be premised on
the unfairness of the state being able to charge a rent
unrelated to the actual value of the land being leased.
Under the pre-1976 lease pricing rules, the basic annual
lease charge was 8% of the appraised value of the unim-
proved industrial land. After adding throughput
charges as part of the renegotiation process, the state's
percentage return in the four cases ranged from 18% to
28% of the land value. Before concluding that these
increases represent an immense burden on the consum-
ers of oil products, it is important to note how reason-
able, in dollar terms, those ligures are in relation to the
value of the refinery enterprises. In the example having
the largest percentage increase, the annual rent went
from $32,000 to something near $110,000. If the plant
involved cost hundreds of millions of dollars to con-
struct, the increased lease cost is a trivial part of the cost
of production. If California wished to be the con-
summate monopolist in its dealings with the "captive"
refineries, the new lease price terms would have been
much higher without regard to how the price wasset.
Further examination of the differences between per-
unit lease pricing and other lease pricing mechanisms
offers only speculative reasons for the particular antipa-
thy to per unit charges. Possibly the industry does not
want the state or competitors to have ready access to the
data concerning their quantity of operation at the plant.
A second possibility is that the per-unit pricing scheme
offers the state an unusually easy way to be sure that it
charges a very high price, but still a price that the market
will bear. Perhaps most plausibly, this case is but the first
step in a long-term strategy of the affected industries to
force the coastal states to refrain from charging prices
for leases in excess of values that relate only to the value
of the lands actually leased. The success of such a strat-
egy would limit the monopoly power of the states to set
prices at whatever level the market will bear.
Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the practical
importance of this particular form of lease pricing ar-
rangement, the legal issues in the case are fairly signifi-
cant to the development of the law in regard to all three
of the constitutional grounds presented in favor of in-
validation. The Commerce Clause analysis is important
because in other contexts evenhanded levies on goods
moving in interstate commerce have been upheld occa-
sionally (see, e.g., Commonwealth Edison 11. lV!CJ/I/t/lUl, 453
U.S. 609 (1981) (tax on striprnined coal almost all of
which was destined for interstate shipment», and have
been struck down occasionally. (See, e.g., EurekaPillf Line
Co. v. Hal/allan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921») Additionally, the
case offers the Court another opportunity to discuss the
PREVIEW
controversial "market participant" doctrine by which
states engaged in market activities are freed from some
of the constitutional strictures forbidding discrimination
against interstate commerce. In regard to the Import-
Export Clause, there is great uncertainty about what
forms of state exaction are constitutionally permissible
general taxation and what forms of exactions are simply
burdens on the privilege of bringing property or goods
into the country. Finally, the Tonnage Clause has so
seldom been a ground of decision, its invocation might
signal a new line of decision in casesof this type.
ARGUMENTS
ForCory, Members oftheCalifornia State LandsCommission
(Counsel of Record, Dennis M. Egan, 6000 State Building,Sail
Francisco, CA94102; telepllone (415) 557-3650)
1. States as lessors of the state's real property are not
subject to strictures greater than those which apply to
other lessors.
2. The state in this case involving the lease of state
property has acted as a market participant and not as
a regulator of commerce and is free to fix the terms
on which it will deal with other parties.
3. The rents charged by the CSLC have been fair mar-
ket rents and involve no discrimination against either
international or interstate commerce.
4. The monopoly position of the state in renegotiating
ground leases with existing lessees improperly mea-
sures the relevant market for such rentals at the time
of lease renegotiation rather than at original negotia-
tion.
5. The per-unit pricing by the CSLC is a reasonable
rental form and therefore does not violate the Com-
merce Clause.
6. The state is not limited to rental fees that attempt to
recoup only the state's out-of-pocket expenses as
might be the case withan inspection fee.
7. The charges involved in this case are dearly rents and
not taxes and are not subject to the same scrutiny as
are taxes.
Issue No. lJ
For Western Oil fJf Gas Association (Counsel of Record,
Philip K. Verlanger, 800 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
CA 90017; telephone (21J) 624-4800
I. The Constitution denies the states the power to col-
lect a charge on goods entering into the state as is
done by per-unit charges for ground leases.
2. The market participant doctrine does not apply to
this case because to do so offends the policy of the
Commerce Clause and allows the state to evade con-
stitutional strictures.
3. The market participant doctrine cannot be applied to
this case because there is no market in lands available
for terminal sites other than those controlled by the
state.
4. A tidelands lease throughput (per-unit) charge is in-
herently discriminatory against interstate and foreign
commerce because almost no intrastate commerce is
likely to be shipped bysea.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In SUpJlbrl of Cory
The cities of Santa Monica, Culver City, Torrance
and Huntington Beach filed an amicus brief raising the
following concerns:
1. The state in leasing land is a market participant, not a
regulator constrained by the dormant Commerce
Clause.
2. The state is not deprived of its market participant
status as a monopolist because it does not enjoy a
monopoly in the relevant market, and even if it did,
its activities would be subject to review under laws
concerned with that subject-not constitutional issues
of regulation and taxing.
3. The Commerce Clause does not require a state to
enter into a contract with a private party on terms
calculated to promote interstate commerce.
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